Several very disturbing aspects about the Iran nuclear deal have come to light which require clear thinking and firm action by all P5+1 parties to the agreement.
For example it is impossible to reconcile assurances of 24/7 surveillance with the subsequently disclosed provision of 24 days’ notice being required before IAEA will be given access to suspicious sites. It does not require any stretch of imagination to foresee that this period can be used to remove evidence and that it could be extended by spurious arguments about special circumstances or inaccessibility. After all President Obama emphasized in his press conference that Iran cannot be trusted
Annex One, Section Q of the agreement requires that IAEA inspectors will first have to ask Iran’s permission to visit a suspicious location: “The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.” After that, Iran has the chance to propose “alternative means” to address IAEA suspicions. All of that will stretch the period.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Charles Duelfer, former Iraq weapons inspector, told the paper that there is a lot the regime can do to hide material in a few hours, let alone days, allowing room for Iran to maneuver and potentially hide much of what it is doing regarding weapons design or component testing.
Side deals and additional causes for concern
As Secretary Perry has declared he is not aware of the recently disclosed secret side deals to the Iran nuclear agreement concluded between the IAEA and Iran, one must conclude that the negotiators for the other P5+1 countries are equally uninformed about some critical details relating to the agreement they concluded with Iran.
In the circumstances one expects all the P5+1 countries to examine every explicit and implicit detail of this historic agreement and to take care to remove all ambiguities that may lead to future disputes about the true meaning and intent of each clause. After all, rational and responsible behavior require nothing less
According to US Senator Tom Cotton and Congressmen Mike Pompeo they were told that the secret side deals will not be shared with other nations, with Congress, nor with the U.S. public.
One of these side deals concerns inspection of the Parchin military base which the IAEA has not been allowed to visit and where it is believed Iran has conducted nuclear-warhead tests.. The other concerns how the IAEA and Iran will resolve outstanding issues on possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s past nuclear program which Iran has consistently refused to divulge over the years
In a July 15 Wall Street Journal op-ed Former Department of Energy official William Tobey explained that for inspections to be meaningful, Iran would have to completely and correctly declare all its relevant nuclear activities and procurement, past and present.
Apart from being denied access to the secret agreements, the P5+1 countries should be even more concerned that they will not be able to determine whether or not Iran will have complied with them.
Evidently Secretary Kerry’s assurances, expressed in the video clip below, that all the information would be received from Iran are far from having been realized.
Troubling too, is the revelation that US inspectors have been banned from the IAEA surveillance team although some claim that they are among the most qualified for the task.
And most incredible of the questions about the nuclear agreement is the suggestion that that the IAEA will not be allowed to collect samples from suspected sites but will have to rely on samples collected and submitted by the Iranians. This would be a “dangerous farce,” according to former CIA intelligence analyst Fred Fleitz in National Review Online.
His warning followed an exchange at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, in which John Kerry would not definitively deny a claim by Sen. James Risch that Iran will be responsible for gathering samples from the military base Parchin.
Sen. Bob Menendez asked Kerry, “Is it true that the Iranians are going to be able to take the sample, as Senator Risch said? Kerry responded, “As you know, that is a classified component of this. It’s supposed to be discussed on a classified setting… I’m not confirming how it’s happening…I’m saying that we are confident that the IAEA jas the ability to get the answers that they need.”
Most disturbing of all, are suggestions from reliable sources that other secret deals probably exist in addition to the two that have been disclosed serendipitously and, as mentioned above, the parliaments of all P5 countries as well as members of the EU need to study the materially very carefully in their own interests bearing in mind their responsibility to future generations.